Is Kenya ready to go nuclear?

TOO HOT TO HANDLE?:
THE FUTURE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR POWER

Copyright © Oxford Research Group, 2007 Some rights reserved. This paper is licensed under a Creative Commons license that allows copy and distribution for non-profit use, provided the authors and ORG are attributed properly and the work is not altered in any way. See creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ for full details. Please contact Oxford Research Group if you would like to translate this report.

About the authors
Dr. Frank Barnaby is Nuclear Issues Consultant to Oxford Research Group (ORG). He is a nuclear physicist by training and worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston between1951-57. He was Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs in the late 1960s and Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from 1971-81.
James Kemp is a Research Associate coordinating ORG's Secure Energy project. From 2001 to 2007, James was ORG’s Fundraising Coordinator and Researcher. James has undertaken research and engaged decision makers on a range of issues, including nuclear terrorism, MoD spending in the UK, EU Security and Defence Policy, government subsidies to UK arms exporters, and government expenditure on conflict prevention.

Acknowledgements
Oxford Research Group (ORG) gratefully acknowledges the support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Polden-Puckham Charitable Foundation, the JMG Foundation, and the Scurrah Wainwright Trust for supporting ORG’s Secure Energy: Options for a Safer World project. We would also like to thank ORG’s supporters and Sustainers. The authors would particularly like to thank David Howarth MP, Thomas Donnelly, Anthony Froggatt, Helen Scott, and Malcolm Savidge for their support and advice. All errors are, of course, the fault of the writers!

SUMMARY

Currently, the world’s nuclear-reactors produce a total of 0.9 Tw (out of a total world power production 15 Tw), giving a total electricity generation of 0.37Tw from nuclear power. This amounts to 56 watts per capita. For comparison, for the non-nuclear types of fuel the world power production is: 5.6 Tw for oil; 3.5 Tw for gas; 3.8 Tw for coal; 0.9 Tw for hydroelectric; and 0.13 Tw for geothermal, wind, solar, and wood. The world per capita energy production is 2,300 watts per capita (6.6 billion people).

Taking just the OECD countries, the countries with nuclear power produce a total of 300,541 MWe of nuclear electricity, or 335 watts per capita. The non-OECD countries (with nuclear power) produce 63,134 Mwe, or 0.018 watts capita. For all OECD countries the production of nuclear energy is 266 watts per capita.

It is probable that by 2075 the world population will reach about 10 billion people. Assuming that countries generate one kilowatt of electricity per capita (probably an underestimation), and that they generate a third of their electricity by nuclear power (twice today’s world share) to mitigate CO2 emissions, the world would need to generate 3 Tw of electricity by nuclear power-reactors, or 3000 reactors (assuming average capacity of 1Gw) -that’s over four new builds a month from now on,* compared to 3.4 per year which is the highest historic rate (France, 1977 to 1993).

Supporters of nuclear power quite rightly point to the fact there are only eight (excluding DPRK) nuclear weapons states, so the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA have successfully managed to control the proliferation risks of civil nuclear power to a reasonable degree. That the international nuclear control regime has prevented widespread weapons proliferation is a little reassuring (if India, Pakistan, Iraq, Israel and DPRK are discounted), but does not mean that it will continue to do so over the next twenty to fifty years or that it can deal with the consequences of a nuclear renaissance, despite recent non-proliferation initiatives.

The question is whether, in the 21st century, the security risks associated with civil nuclear power can be managed or not?

FOREWORD

In the 1970s we used to say that if nuclear power was the answer, it must have been a very silly question. But as Britain’s former Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted on saying at every opportunity he had, nuclear power is back on the agenda ‘with a vengeance’. It is not that nuclear power has changed much in its basic characteristics -it is still the same inherently dangerous, though immensely powerful, process that it always was. It is just that it has found a new question, that of climate change, to which it can pose as the answer. In the words of the great organisational theorists Cohen, March and Olsen nuclear power is ‘an answer actively looking for a question’.

If one were to set out to design from scratch a solution for the problem of climate change in a world without nuclear power, there is little chance that anyone would come up with nuclear power as that solution, or, if they did, that anyone would think that nuclear power was anywhere near acceptable. It would look simply too risky to try, especially in comparison with all the other options, from energy saving to renewable energy and carbon capture and storage. Technological progress will undoubtedly form part of the world’s response to climate change, but not all novelties constitute progress.

And yet acceptance of nuclear power is growing. That is partly because some people believe the myth that without nuclear power, the lights will go out or that we will have to return to medieval levels of energy usage -a claim particularly absurd in a country such as Britain in which the potential for renewable power vastly exceeds current electricity consumption. But it is also partly because many people seem to have forgotten about nuclear power’s inherent problems. That is why Frank Barnaby and James Kemp’s work is so much to be welcomed. They remind us about what makes nuclear power more of a problem than a solution.

They make important new points, such as the infeasible rate of building new nuclear power stations that would be needed for a nuclear renaissance to make much of a global difference, alongside restating older points, such as the problem of the declining quality of uranium ore that undermines some of the more extravagant claims about nuclear power’s low carbon footprint. But above all, they analyse in convincing and sometimes alarming detail the problems of international and domestic security that a worldwide revival in nuclear power would pose. An international nuclear renaissance, especially if it moves in the direction that nuclear enthusiasts want of using MOX fuel and of developing fast-breeder reactors, will lead to very great dangers indeed in terms of nuclear weapons proliferation and the threat of terrorist action.

Apologists for nuclear power sometimes say that they doubt whether a pro-nuclear decision in Britain will make much difference to whether the rest of the world goes nuclear. That is a dangerous argument. It is the same as that used by those who say that since Britain is the source of only 2% of world greenhouse gas emissions, we should do nothing about climate change. Its use by the nuclear lobby makes one doubt the sincerity of their claim to be concerned about climate change in the first place. It is also wrong. What possible standing can we have to ask other countries to restrain themselves if we ourselves refuse to do so? Britain is admittedly no longer a great power. It can no longer require anyone to do anything. But it can try to regain at least some semblance of moral leadership.

"Nuclear power is unique. It is the only form of electricity production that in itself poses a threat to international peace and domestic security. It is also, as a consequence of its dangers and of the secrecy that inevitably surrounds it because of its connections with nuclear weapons, the only form of electricity production that in itself poses a threat to individual liberties. Those who advocate it might not care about peace or freedom, but for those of us who do, we cannot say that we were not warned."

David Howarth MP Liberal Democrat Shadow Energy Spokesperson, June 2007

INTRODUCTION

Many countries, the UK among them, are reviewing their nuclear-energy policies because they are concerned about:

• the security of their energy (electricity) supplies; and
• the consequences of global warming.

Energy security
Assuming a business as usual scenario, global energy demand is projected to be 50% higher in 2030 than today.1 Regardless of the scenario, most of the demand growth will occur in China, India and East Asia, although demand in Middle Eastern and North African states is expected to grow significantly too.2 Unless major changes to national and regional energy policies are implemented, over 60% of this demand increase is anticipated to be met by coal, oil and natural gas, with serious consequences for global CO2 emissions. China, for example, is currently commissioning a new one gigawatt (Gw) coal powered electricity station every five days, using standard technology which releases all the carbon dioxide in the coal into the atmosphere.3

The combination of intensifying competition for fossil fuels and a concentration on a small number of producing states leads to considerable medium-term insecurity over supplies. In this context, nuclear power is presented as an effective way to reduce dependency on imported fossil fuels and increase baseload electricity security.

Global warming
42 Gigatonnes (gT) of CO2 equivalent are emitted annually.4 If emissions were capped at this level then atmospheric Greenhouse Gas (GHG) concentrations would reach 550 parts per million (ppm) by 2050 (today they are between 311-435 ppm compared to 280 ppm before the industrial revolution).5 At between 480 and 550 ppm the global average temperature would rise by 2 oC above pre-industrial levels.

According to the scientific consensus, to keep climate change within manageable limits it is essential that global average temperature increase is less than 2 oC. At 3 oC and above, the changes to various climate systems would threaten to lead to runaway changes to the climate.6 But the annual flow of emissions is not static, it is increasing, meaning that 550 ppm could be reached if not exceeded by 2035 unless urgent action is taken.7

What is required to reduce the risk of the global temperature rising above 2 oC is at least a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2050 against 2000 levels. Given that 24% (and growing) of global CO2 emissions are produced by the power sector (and 65% in the energy sector), this sector has the potential for making significant contributions to reductions in CO2 emissions. Below is an outline of the potential civil nuclear power contains for mitigating CO2 emissions, based on:

1 current nuclear capacity; 2 new reactors under construction; 3 planned and proposed reactors; and 4 future demand for electricity.

Plans and proposals to construct new nuclear-power reactors

Some countries have announced plans to build new reactors. In addition, some countries have announced that they propose to build new nuclear-power reactors. These are, of course, in many cases much less certain to be built than those planned.

under construction

The 25 new reactors will, on average, each generate somewhat less electricity than those already operating
¬about 770 MWe compared to about 850 MWe.

The amount of electricity generated by these 76 planned reactors will, on average, be greater than that generated by those under construction -about 1,100 MWe compared with 770 MWe. The amount of electricity generated by these 162 proposed reactors will, on average, be about 800 MWe.

If all the proposed reactors are built the number of countries operating nuclear-power reactors will increase from today’s number of 31 to 38. Some future reactors will generate more electricity than those used today. The new reactor under construction in Finland, for example, will have a generating capacity of 1,600 MWe. However, smaller nuclear-power reactors are better suited to supplying the electricity needs of some countries. The reactors that South Africa proposes to construct have an average generating capacity of less than 200 MWe. But reactors of 1,000 MWe and more will become commonplace.

A number of other governments have indicated that they may, at some future date, construct new nuclear reactors. The UK, for example, may build eight new reactors, two at each of four sites on which an existing nuclear-power reactor is operating. Middle Eastern countries newly interested in nuclear power include Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.11

Future demands for electricity

Future demands for energy will depend on population size and consumption patterns. It is probable that by 2075, for example, the population of China will reach about 1,600 million, that of India will be about 1,800 million, and that of Indonesia will be about 375 million. Assuming that these countries generate one kilowatt of electricity per capita (probably an underestimation), and that they generate a third of their electricity by nuclear power (twice today’s world share but only around one-sixth of total energy consumption), China would require about 530 GWe of nuclear power, India would require about 600 GWe, and Indonesia would require about 125 GWe.

For comparison, the population of the USA is likely to be about 445 million by 2075, requiring about 146 GWe, assuming one kilowatt of electricity per capita and a third of the electricity generated by nuclear power. Bangladesh, Brazil, Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan would each need more that 65 GWe. Bangladesh, Congo, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Nigeria now have no nuclear-power reactors. But if nuclear power were to play more than a marginal role in combating global warming then some nuclear-power reactors would have to be operated in these countries.12

The future of nuclear power: how many would we need to help?

Taking an average reactor size of 1,000 MWe (many will be breeder reactors), between 2,000 and 2,500 power reactors will be needed worldwide.13 If we take 2,250 new reactors, then between now and 2075 nearly three new reactors a month would need to start delivering electricity to their respective grids. Moreover, because of the limited lifespans of nuclear-power reactors old reactors will have to be replaced.14 Lets say it will be fifteen years until a new reactor is delivering electricity (2022), but that an additional 250 reactors would be required to replace the aging fleet. This means that nearly four new reactors would have to begin construction each month from now until 2075.

A civil nuclear construction and supply programme on this scale is a pipedream. In the UK it is expected to take at least 17 years from licensing to generating electricity.15 No previous civil nuclear power programme has got anywhere near the kind of new build rate discussed above. France operates the largest number of nuclear-power reactors, with 59 operating nuclear-power reactors, generating 76% of its own electricity and having some surplus electricity to export to other European countries. In addition, France has permanently shut down 11 reactors, many of them associated with the French nuclear-weapon programme. Between 1977 and 1993, 58 nuclear power reactors came into operation -an average of 3.4 reactors per year.

Why are breeder nuclear reactors sought?

A significant increase in the use of nuclear power for electricity generation will, in the medium- and long-term, lead to the operation of so-called generation IV reactors. A number of countries are experimenting with breeder reactors. Using a cunning design, they produce more nuclear fuel than they use. Therefore, a significant use of breeder reactors would decrease demand for uranium fuel and extend uranium supply. Future breeder reactors will be fuelled with plutonium and only power a small input of uranium. The plutonium will be of a type suitable for use in the most efficient nuclear weapons. Thus, the normal operation of these reactors will, as a matter of course, multiply the amount of weapons useable plutonium available across the world. Why invest in
breeder technology?

The DTI cites OECD/NEA ‘Red Book’ figures to claim that based on 2004 generation levels, known uranium reserves (at $130/kg) will last for around 85 years.33 This headline figure conceals important details which affect the security of uranium supply into the future. Due to restrictions on the availability generation IV reactors to be used commercially after about 2030. Otherwise, it is anticipated that uranium reserves will not be able to supply demand. Insecurity of uranium supplies is a significant driver for commercial breeder technology.

Nuclear Weapons

A significant use of generation III and IV reactors will carry with it the real risk that nuclear terrorist groups will eventually acquire plutonium, fabricate primitive nuclear weapons and use them in terrorist attacks.

Any country operating new nuclear-power reactors, particularly breeder reactors, will have relatively easy access to plutonium usable in effective nuclear weapons and will have competent nuclear physicists and engineers who could design and fabricate them. Because they could produce a nuclear force in a short time -months rather than years -these countries will be latent nuclear-weapon powers. Within 30-40 years, according to the IAEA, about 30 countries are likely to have access to fissile materials from their civil nuclear power programmes that can be used for nuclear weapons and competent nuclear physicists and engineers who could design and fabricate them.

The crux of the issue is whether any of these countries will take the political decision to become nuclear-weapon powers, i.e. can the international community manage the proliferation risks associated with current trends in civil nuclear power, let alone a nuclear ‘renaissance’? What drives the political decision-making?

This risk boils down to perceptions of capability and intent. In the case of Iran, for example, there is considerable distrust over sections of the ruling elite’s intentions. This is why the USA, Britain and many other states are so anxious to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. If Iran did become a nuclear weapons state, its capability would change, affecting the balance of power in the strategically vital Middle East and elsewhere.

It takes many years to develop a strategic nuclear weapons programme. Decision-makers assessing national vulnerabilities, looking perhaps to begin lengthy and binding defence projects, would first of all make medium-term assessments of the intentions and capabilities of a range of state and non-state actors that impact upon defence policy.34 If a state of concern or potential concern decided to develop a civil nuclear power programme, defence strategists would certainly take that information into account -it signals to defence planners the potential to develop the resources and expertise required for a nuclear weapons programme some time in the future. In short, a civil nuclear power programme changes assessments of capability.

This process of weighing up and anticipating intentions and capabilities to assess vulnerabilities and recommend defence policies, including latent nuclear weapons programme, may be part-fueling the nuclear renaissance. We must remember that such a process is not scientific or rational: the fears and hopes of individual decision-makers involved in this type of decision are important. This fact is sigificant and very hard to account for in official decision-making.

Where trust in existing mechanisms for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials is weak, as they are today, decision-makers and planners might ‘hedge their bets’ to protect vulnerabilities. Mutual suspicion is signalled by one person’s prudence, which is to another is a provocative act. These are the raw ingredients of a slow burning arms race.

Nuclear terrorism

The world of the nuclear ‘renaissance’ will be one containing a huge amount of separated plutonium, some of which is bound to fall into the wrong hands including those of terrorists. Surprisingly, the potential spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists is receiving very little attention.

By 2075, the nuclear industry predicts that most nuclear electricity will be generated by fast breeder reactors. If this is correct, more than 4,000 tonnes of plutonium will have to be fabricated into fresh reactor fuel each year -twenty times the current military stockpile. Society has to decide whether or not the risks of nuclear-weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism in a world with many nuclear-power reactors are acceptable.

The key activity to be considered is the reprocessing of the spent reactor fuel elements to separate chemically unused uranium from the plutonium and the fission products in the elements. When removed from the reactor the fuel elements are so radioactive that they are self-protecting. No one can get near them and survive -they have to be handled remotely using very heavy remote-handling equipment. After reprocessing, however, the plutonium can be handled relatively easily.

A nuclear terrorist attack may be one of several types. A terrorist group may attack, sabotage or hijack a transporter of nuclear material, such as radioactive waste. They may blow up containers of radioactive waste to spread the radioactivity. The more nuclear-power stations there are the greater will be the number of nuclear transports.

Terrorists may attack a plutonium store at a reprocessing plant, like Sellafield, to spread the plutonium in it. Plutonium is a very toxic substance, particularly when inhaled. The human environment must, therefore, be kept completely free of it. Even small amounts of plutonium contamination must be removed.

A crude terrorist nuclear explosive

Terrorists may acquire plutonium to make and detonate a crude nuclear weapon. They would do so using the implosion technique. This would involve surrounding a sphere of plutonium, having a mass less than the critical mass, or surrounding a spherical volume of plutonium dioxide, of less than critical mass, by conventional high explosives.

A terrorist group containing people with appropriate skills could design and fabricate such a crude nuclear explosive. The size of the nuclear explosion from such a crude device is impossible to predict. But even if it were only equivalent to the explosion of a few tens of tonnes of TNT it would completely devastate the centre of a large city. Such a device would, however, have a strong chance of exploding with an explosive power of at least a hundred tonnes of TNT. Even one thousand tonnes or more equivalent is possible, but unlikely.

Terrorists would be satisfied with a nuclear explosive device that is far less sophisticated than the types of nuclear weapons demanded by the military. Whereas the military demand nuclear weapons with predictable explosive yields and very high reliability, most terrorists would be satisfied with a relatively primitive nuclear explosive.

Terrorist use of a radiological weapon

The simplest and most primitive terrorist nuclear device is a radiological weapon or radiological dispersal device, commonly called a dirty bomb. A dirty bomb would consist of a conventional high explosive (for example, semtex, dynamite or TNT), some incendiary material (like thermite) surrounding the conventional explosive, and a quantity of a radioisotope, probably placed at the centre of the explosive.

When the conventional high explosive is detonated the radioactive material would be vaporised. The fire ignited by the incendiary material would carry the radioactivity up into the atmosphere. It would then be blown downwind, spreading radioactivity. A dirty bomb is not the same as a nuclear weapon in the normal sense of the phrase -it does not involve a nuclear explosion.

The use of plutonium in a dirty bomb would cause the greatest threat to human health, because of its very high inhalation toxicity, and the most extensive contamination. Radioactive waste could also be used.

Many other types of radioisotopes (radioactive isotopes) would be suitable for use in a dirty bomb. But the most likely one to be used is one that is that is relatively easily available, has a relatively long half-life, and emits energetic radiation. Suitable ones include caesium-137, cobalt-60, and iridium-192; these emit mainly gamma rays (electromagnetic radiation). Strontium-90, which emits beta particles (electrons) and is concentrated in bone, is also a possible candidate.

The detonation of a dirty bomb is likely to result in some deaths but would not result in the hundreds of thousands of fatalities that could be caused by the explosion in a city of a crude nuclear weapon. Generally, the explosion of the conventional explosive would be the most likely cause of any immediate deaths or serious injuries.

The radioactive material in the bomb would be dispersed into the air but would be soon diluted to relatively low concentrations. If the bomb is exploded in a city, as it almost certainly would be, some people are likely to be exposed to a dose of radiation. But the dose is in most cases likely to be relatively small. A low-level exposure to radiation would slightly increase the long-term risk of cancer.

The main potential impact of a dirty bomb is psychological -it would cause considerable fear, panic and social disruption, exactly the effects terrorists wish to achieve. The public fear of radiation is very great indeed, some say irrationally so.

The explosion of a dirty bomb could result in the contamination of an area of a city and the surrounding areas with radioactivity. Areas as large as tens of square kilometres could be contaminated with radioactivity to levels above those recommended by the National Radiological Protection Board for the exposure of civilians to radioactivity. The area would have to be evacuated and decontaminated.

The degree of contamination would depend on the amount of high explosive used, the amount and type of radioisotope released during the explosion of the bomb, the nature of the device used to spread the radioactivity, whether it was exploded inside a building or outside, and speed and direction of the wind, the general weather conditions, and the size and position of buildings near the detonation site. The size of the radioactive particles released by the device will determine how far they are carried by the wind and how easily people inhale them. Radioactivity will be carried away on people’s clothes and spread by vehicles passing through the contaminated areas. People may also ingest radioactivity by eating contaminated food and drinking contaminated water.

In the longer term, any exposure to ionising radiation can cause fatal cancers. The number of fatalities in a group of people will be proportional to the total radiation dose received by the group.

The effects on the health of people exposed to the radioactivity released by a dirty bomb will depend on how long they remain in the contaminated area, the size of the particles released by the explosion and the type of radioactivity emitted by the radioisotopes in the bomb. Decontamination is likely to be very costly (costing millions of pounds) and take weeks or, most likely, many months to complete.

There are no ways to decontaminate effectively buildings contaminated with significant amounts of radioactivity; the buildings may, in practice, have to be demolished. If a dirty bomb were detonated in, for example, London’s Oxford Street or in the City of London, the cost would be huge, potentially many hundreds of millions of pounds (the wider economic affects could be devastating).
Such is the public fear of ionising radiation that even relatively small levels of radioactive contamination on or in buildings, on roads or footpaths, or on public areas would be publicly unacceptable. Decontamination would have to be virtually complete. Roads and walkways in contaminated areas, for example, would have to be re-surfaced. Radioactive contamination is by far the most threatening aspect of a dirty bomb.

Terrorist attack on a nuclear-power station 35

Instead of exploding a nuclear weapon, a terrorist group may decide to attack a nuclear facility. It is generally recognised that a terrorist group with significant resources could attack and damage a nuclear-power plant. There is argument, however, about how much damage and how many people would be harmed by such an attack. It is probably true that attacks on nuclear-power plants that could do a great deal of damage and cause many fatalities do not have a large chance of success. But many believe that the damage caused by and the number of people killed by a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear-power plant could be so catastrophic that even a small risk of such an attack is not acceptable.

There are two potential targets in a nuclear-power station for a terrorist attack: the reactor itself and the ponds storing the spent fuel removed from the reactor. An attack on the reactor could cause the core to go super-critical (as happened during the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl reactor) or cause a loss of the coolant that removes heat from the core of the reactor (as happened during the reactor accident at Three Mile Island).

Spent fuel elements are normally kept in storage ponds for five or ten years under three or so metres of water before they are either finally disposed of in a geological repository or sent to a reprocessing plant where the plutonium inevitably produced in the fuel elements is chemically separated from unused uranium and fission products in the fuel elements. The ponds are normally built close to the reactor building. The buildings containing the spent fuel ponds are less well protected than the reactor and are, therefore, more attractive targets than the reactor building.

Terrorists could target a reactor or spent fuel pond by: using a truck carrying high explosives and exploding it near a critical part of the target; exploding high explosives carried in a light aircraft near a critical part of the target; crashing a high-jacked commercial airliner into the reactor building or spent-fuel pond; attacking the power station with small arms, artillery or missiles and occupying it; or by attacking the power lines carrying electricity into the plant.

Alternatively, a terrorist group may infiltrate some of its members, or sympathisers, into the plant to sabotage it from inside. A saboteur may attack, for example, the systems cooling the reactor core or drain water from the cooling pond. This could cause the temperature of the reactor core to rise, resulting in a release of radioactivity from the core, or cause the temperature of the spent fuel rods to rise, again resulting in a release of radioactivity.

Measures to counter nuclear terrorism

To effectively counter nuclear terrorism it is important to prevent terrorists from acquiring plutonium and from acquiring significant quantities of radioactive materials to build a dirty bomb. The protection of these nuclear materials is clearly of the utmost importance.

It seems that UK government policy is to stop operating the THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield in 2010 but presumably the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) will continue operating using plutonium from stock. The future risk of a terrorist group acquiring plutonium from MOX will, therefore, remain.

Society should consider whether or not the risk that terrorists will acquire plutonium and make and detonate a nuclear weapon is unacceptably high. If it is too high, a decision should be taken to shut down SMP.

Making existing nuclear-power reactors less vulnerable to terrorist attack is not very feasible although storage ponds for spent fuel elements could be more hardened. And greater care could be taken to vet staff to make it more difficult for a terrorist group to infiltrate people into a nuclear-power station. Also, staff in all sensitive nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants and MOX fabrication plants, should be thoroughly vetted.

The protection of a nuclear facility with, for example, fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missiles is, to say the least, not an easy task. If a terrorist group hijacks a commercial aircraft on a regular flight path that takes it close to, for example, the Sellafield establishment and dives it on to a target in the nuclear facility, the time available to make sure that the aircraft really is attacking the facility and then to scramble fighter aircraft or fire surface-to-air missiles is probably too short to make a successful interception.

The capacity of intelligence and security services to prevent nuclear terrorism in a world of many more potential targets also needs very careful consideration. In the UK new nuclear plants will be required to build-in physical protection measures based on “Design Basis Threats” (DBTs) to reduce vulnerability to a range of terrorist attack scenarios. The details of these are confidential, so it is impossible to independently verify their adequacy.

The combination of DBTs with various other physical and human security measures including counter-terrorism exercises, staff vetting, and, of course, on-going security and intelligence work, are sufficient for the Office of Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) and Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) to assert that: “the risks associated with building new nuclear power stations can be appropriately managed.”36 This may be the case today, but will it be true in ten, twenty or thirty years time? And if the threat assessment change, how the oprerators of a new nuclear plant adapt and at what cost? How would the market and public respond to a foiled terrorist attack against a nuclear plant, let-alone a successful one?

Even a failed terrorist attack on one of the first new builds would most probably cause subsequent new build to halt in many countries. If this happened, Governments would need to re-review energy policy minus civil nuclear power, further delaying progress towards a sustainable and secure energy policy, possibly causing the UK and other affected countries to miss the window of opportunity to seriously mitigate CO2 emissions.

Related post:

Courting Disaster: Why Kenyans Must Stop Oloolua Nuclear Waste Plant

Kenya is a few days away from hosting the first ever dreaded and less understood radioactive waste processing facility at Oloolua, located at the institute of primate research in Kajiado district. If the facility is allowed to proceed, Kenyans will without doubt pay dearly, in the same way history is certain to harshly judge the current generation. Why?

Read more........

kenvironews.wordpress.com/2008/07/09/courting-disaster-why-kenyans-must-stop-oloolua-nuclear-waste-plant/

I just wonder where the nuclear waste will be stored? NOT in my backyard puleeze.

Arent there better, less toxic, renewable sources of energy?


whats the SAfrican experience with nuclear technology like?

An early warning system for Kenya NOT to go nuclear!!

The Renaissance of the Anti-Nuclear Movement

We shouldn’t rant about oil or rain when we can turn to nuclear power


Shaukat Abdulrazak

Energy is fast becoming a political issue. A few months ago, the high costs of electricity badly hit domestic and industrial consumers alike.

Kenya produces about 68 per cent of its electricity from hydropower, but due to rainfall shortages experienced in the recent past, hydroelectric power only produces 46 per cent of the electricity used. Apart from fossil fuel, the country uses renewable energy sources such as solar, geothermal, and wind at a very low level. Kenya’s geothermal potential is estimated at 7,000MW, however only 130MW of this potential has been utilised. The total installed energy capacity stands at 1,215MW against a peak demand of 1,150MW.

To meet the country’s goal of industrialisation, massive investment in electricity generation, transmission and connection must be made. Nuclear energy could be part of the solution.

Nuclear energy provides between 14 per cent and 15 per cent of world’s electricity. Industrialised countries such as France, Germany and Britain are among the key players in the industry. In Africa, South Africa has two nuclear power plants with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan, Egypt, and Libya also showing interest in the technology. Currently there are approximately 470 nuclear reactors in the world.

The effects of global warming are already here and the future looks dire unless we act. Therefore, alternative energy must be employed.

Nuclear power could be part of the solution to confront global warming as nuclear energy emits less greenhouse gas than renewable energy sources such as hydro, wind, solar and biomass.

Nuclear fission, the splitting of a heavy atom’s nucleus, releases great amounts of energy. For example, the energy it releases is 10 million times greater than what is released by the burning of an atom of fossil fuel.

Uranium is obtained from open-cut mines and is not expensive to mine. It is estimated that world reserves can last up to 150 years. Nuclear fuel is inexpensive. The initial investment is very high but in the long term nuclear energy could serve as a stable sustainable and clean power supply. A medium-sized nuclear plant has an operational life of between 40 and 70 years.

Nuclear energy is considered differently because of the issues associated with the possession, control, and handling of radioactive material. Other issue regard safety; terrorist groups have risen and they could target nuclear power stations. At the same time, some countries that obtain nuclear technology may try to use it to develop nuclear weapons as well as power stations. Some governments may be regarded as terrorist in their willingness to use nuclear weapons or sell uranium to States that have not signed the international nuclear proliferation treaty.

A nuclear power programme is a major undertaking requiring careful planning, preparation and investment in time and human resources and Kenya must be ready to face the challenge.

The development and implementation of an appropriate infrastructure to support the successful introduction of nuclear power and its safe, secure, peaceful, and efficient application is a central issue for countries that are considering and planning the first nuclear power plant.

Of particular importance is the legal framework; this is the foundation of any country wishing to undertake a nuclear power programme. The Government should come up with nuclear friendly policies that encourage the development of nuclear energy.

A management system for nuclear facilities and activities needs to be installed. One that deals in a coherent manner with safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic requirements throughout the lifetime of the facilities and for the entire duration of activities in normal, transient and emergency situations. We also need to have in place emergency preparedness — when Kenya eventually places reliance on nuclear power we must take steps to ensure safe operation and prepare for the possibility that the efforts might fail and a nuclear emergency could arise.

Financial stability is another factor to be considered. This is especially so with the advent of constraints on carbon emissions. To sustain safety, adequate financial support throughout and beyond the operating life of the plant is necessary.

The Government, through the Ministry of Energy, should look for investors who can put up a nuclear plant that would generate about 1,000 MW of power, worth Sh78 billion, invite nuclear experts to advise on nuclear power generation. The experts could be from IAEA and the University of Nairobi’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, among others.

Suitable sites in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and parts of the Coast could be identified as possible locations for the power plant. This matter requires leadership that thinks big.

There is nothing wrong with the Iranian President visiting Kenya. It all depends on what the agenda is.

Kenya is not ready for nuclear power, Raila is one lost fellow. We cannot be a starving nation with nuclear power.

Source: Nuclear Power Daily

CIVIL NUCLEAR
Launch date to be set for Iran's first nuclear plant

by Staff Writers
Tehran (AFP) Feb 24, 2009


Iran plans to carry out a dry run on Wednesday at the much-delayed 1,000-megawatt plant.

Iran and Russia will announce on Wednesday a date for the Islamic republic's first nuclear power plant to go operational, the official IRNA news agency reported.

"The exact date for the start of operations at Bushehr nuclear plant will be announced at the plant on Wednesday," the spokesman for Russia's federal nuclear agency, Sergei Novikov, told IRNA in Moscow.

Iran plans to carry out a dry run on Wednesday at the much-delayed 1,000-megawatt plant which it has been building in the Gulf port of Bushehr with Russian assistance.

Novikov stressed that the operation would involve "virtual fuel not nuclear fuel rods".

Iran announced on Sunday that it planned to "pre-commission" the plant this week without specifying what the operation entailed.

Russia took over construction of the plant in 1994 but completion has been delayed due to a number of factors, particularly Western accusations that Iran's nuclear programme is cover for a weapons drive, something Tehran strongly denies.

Novikov said that the chief of the Russian nuclear agency, Sergei Kiriyenko, had already left Moscow to attend Wednesday's function in Bushehr.

Earlier this month, Kiriyenko said the actual "technical launch" of the plant was possible before the end of 2009 if there were no delays caused by "unforeseen circumstances."

The UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in its latest report on Iran released last week, said it has been informed by Tehran that the loading of the fuel into the reactor is scheduled to take place only during the second quarter of 2009.

The fuel, supplied by Moscow, is currently under IAEA seal.

All the main equipment at Bushehr has been installed by Russian contractor Atomstroiexport.

The start-up of the plant, as and when it happens, will be a leap forward in Iran's efforts to develop nuclear technology.