Post by Onyango Oloo on Jul 19, 2014 19:04:57 GMT 3
FYI re: Mpeketoni from Somalia newsroom.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Truth and Fiction: Who’s Really Behind Terrorist Attacks in
Kenya? Somalia newsroom
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 23:02:39 +0100
Truth and Fiction: Who’s Really Behind Terrorist Attacks in Kenya?
FEATURED
Terrorist operations in Nairobi, Mombasa, Mpeketoni and other sites in
Kenya’s urban and coastal towns have driven a polemic debate about who
exactly is responsible.
Before and after al-Shabaab’s September 2013 attack at the Westgate
Mall, dozens of unclaimed grenade and IED explosions in the country
caused considerable confusion among the public about whether the bombs
were the work of al-Shabaab, local affiliate al-Hijra, or even “false
flag” attacks by rival Kenyan businessmen.
Now that al-Shabaab has increased the number of attacks it has claimed
in Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration has been absolving them at
each opportunity and blaming various opposition groups and politicians
instead.
If Uhuru is correct in claiming that al-Shabaab (and its local affiliate
al-Hijra) are not responsible for recent attacks, it would mean that the
estimated 700 al-Hijra members and countless al-Shabaab militants (from
various countries) that are able to cross the porous border with Somalia
have been decisively silent in recent months.
In many ways, this is an unlikely proposition.
To many observers, Uhuru’s deflection of al-Shabaab claims is a
continuation of a strategy in which he has blamed the opposition for
using “hate speech” and incitement that could be used to instigate early
elections–or worse–mass violence at a level seen during the ’07-’08
election crisis that could force another coalition government.
If you believe the hype, it’s Raila’s would-be coup by another name.
These days, Uhuru’s simmering allegations have thickened to the point of
blaming rival political elements for terrorist attacks as well.
The strategy could easily backfire.
If Uhuru’s allegations are credible that politicians, aggrieved Coastal
squatters, criminal gangs, and separatist groups all have the capability
and desire to organize attacks at the current magnitude, this would be a
damning revelation about the ineffectiveness of the administration’s
post-Westgate response to insecurity.
But all these claims hinge of evidence that is hard to sort through.
Lack of Clear Evidence
The biggest problem with Uhuru’s claims is that clear cut evidence has
not been presented about who has been responsible for most of the attacks.
For example, the alleged driver of Mpeketoni militants Diana Salim
Suleiman claimed he was viciously beaten and his matatu hijacked as
militants forced him to act as the chaffeur from hell during the June 15
attacks claimed by al-Shabaab.
While some may doubt Suleiman’s story, his portrayal of events was
mirrored in the subsequent attack at Gamba in which Kenyan police
officers say militants “got to the police station by car-jacking a truck
and killing its three occupants.”
Additionally, the Kenyan government (GoK) said it had “prior
intelligence” of an imminent threat around Lamu before the Mpeketoni
attack. This would ostensibly indicate that GoK would have some tangible
proof of key individuals or groups that were organizing the attack.
However, after the attack, United Democratic Forum (UDF) member and Lamu
governor Issa Timamy was booked on murder/terrorism charges without
any convincing evidence being presented publicly. In fact, police even
asked for more time after his arrest to search for more evidence–all
signs that this was not a slam dunk case as of yet.
After al-Shabaab claimed carrying out operations in the Hindi and Gamba
areas, Kenyan police blamed the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)
separatists after finding hastily scribbled messages referencing the
group (and CORD leader Raila Odinga) on a small school blackboard.
But the meaning of the messages was not perfectly clear.
The first message read in Kiswahili “Raila [is] sufficient.” This could
have been a reference to his call for Kenyan troops to withdraw from
Somalia–or any other number of interpretations.
The second message appeared to be directed at MRC members–not from them
as interpreted by Kenyan police. It called for “sleeping” Muslims in MRC
to “wake up”–followed by very specific anti-Uhuru anti-Christian
imperatives.
If this was the basis for blaming MRC, Kenyan police look as if they
have a case that is weak enough to preclude singling the group out as
exclusively responsible–especially considering the tactics used in the
operations.
The Quran tests used in militants’ recent Coast attacks mirror similar
tactics used at the Westgate siege, which was organized by al-Qaeda East
Africa apprentice/al-Shabaab commander Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir
“Ikrima.”
Notably, the Westgate attack also may have used the resources of an
al-Hijra-linked al-Shabaab leader for Kenyans named Sheikh Ahmad Iman
Ali–who may have a hand in Coast attacks as well.
The recite-or-die tactic does not appear to have been used by other
opposition groups in Kenya–though the knife and arson attacks that have
occurred are alleged modes of operation for MRC.
Additionally, it has been rumored in the past that al-Shabaab has tried
to recruit among extreme factions of MRC–which has both Christian and
Muslim membership. This convenient exploitation is possible, and
al-Shabaab has recruited from other East African groups with
longstanding grievances including Uamsho and the Ansar Muslim Youth
Centre in Tanzania.
Yet no current proof has been presented that collaboration with MRC has
been operationalized in recent attacks.
Setting MRC to the side, there are plenty of other grievances holders on
the Coast that still seek redress.
Since GoK has failed to address the fact that many local communities on
the Coast have had land stolen from them by government officials and
other tribes in the last several decades, it is no surprise that
al-Shabaab would be recruiting among them.
As many of these potential recruits would be Muslim “squatters,” their
narratives are interesting to unwrap in the regional context.
When Coast attackers speak of “Christian invaders” stealing territory
and abusing Muslims in “Muslim lands,” their argument is applicable to
them both in Kenya and Somalia.
Al-Shabaab is using this duality to its advantage by recruiting and
carrying out attacks in both countries.
Contrastingly, Uhuru is misguidedly re-framing the argument as a mostly
local and tribal issue–seemingly in pursuit of his own political agenda
while ignoring the larger context.
Uhuru is able to redirect blame at “local political networks” rather
than open up the possibility that extremist groups are exploiting these
very dynamics.
Future Implications
Common sense on recent attacks in Kenya point to al-Shabaab and its
affiliated sympathizers, but this should not discount other actors.
Equally important, understanding the possibilities of who is working
with extremist groups requires a realization that different types of
people are involved: those possibly looking for a quick buck, those
allegedly kidnapped by extremists, Kenyans not “of Somali origin,” and
potentially others with varying motivations.
Without knowing the nature of the problem, Kenya can not claim to know
the nature of the solution.
The GoK’s failure to present concrete evidence about who is responsible,
its non-sensical and ineffective policies in response to attacks, and
its politicization of investigations will further sow confusion and
subsequent scapegoating among the public against blameless targets.
It is this kind of increased social anxiety and resorting to
stereotyping that could exacerbate tribal and religious tensions that
extremists need to legitimize their cause and violent operations.
While Uhuru should in theory rush to correct these mis-steps, security
often plays second fiddle to domestic political goals.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Truth and Fiction: Who’s Really Behind Terrorist Attacks in
Kenya? Somalia newsroom
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 23:02:39 +0100
Truth and Fiction: Who’s Really Behind Terrorist Attacks in Kenya?
FEATURED
Terrorist operations in Nairobi, Mombasa, Mpeketoni and other sites in
Kenya’s urban and coastal towns have driven a polemic debate about who
exactly is responsible.
Before and after al-Shabaab’s September 2013 attack at the Westgate
Mall, dozens of unclaimed grenade and IED explosions in the country
caused considerable confusion among the public about whether the bombs
were the work of al-Shabaab, local affiliate al-Hijra, or even “false
flag” attacks by rival Kenyan businessmen.
Now that al-Shabaab has increased the number of attacks it has claimed
in Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration has been absolving them at
each opportunity and blaming various opposition groups and politicians
instead.
If Uhuru is correct in claiming that al-Shabaab (and its local affiliate
al-Hijra) are not responsible for recent attacks, it would mean that the
estimated 700 al-Hijra members and countless al-Shabaab militants (from
various countries) that are able to cross the porous border with Somalia
have been decisively silent in recent months.
In many ways, this is an unlikely proposition.
To many observers, Uhuru’s deflection of al-Shabaab claims is a
continuation of a strategy in which he has blamed the opposition for
using “hate speech” and incitement that could be used to instigate early
elections–or worse–mass violence at a level seen during the ’07-’08
election crisis that could force another coalition government.
If you believe the hype, it’s Raila’s would-be coup by another name.
These days, Uhuru’s simmering allegations have thickened to the point of
blaming rival political elements for terrorist attacks as well.
The strategy could easily backfire.
If Uhuru’s allegations are credible that politicians, aggrieved Coastal
squatters, criminal gangs, and separatist groups all have the capability
and desire to organize attacks at the current magnitude, this would be a
damning revelation about the ineffectiveness of the administration’s
post-Westgate response to insecurity.
But all these claims hinge of evidence that is hard to sort through.
Lack of Clear Evidence
The biggest problem with Uhuru’s claims is that clear cut evidence has
not been presented about who has been responsible for most of the attacks.
For example, the alleged driver of Mpeketoni militants Diana Salim
Suleiman claimed he was viciously beaten and his matatu hijacked as
militants forced him to act as the chaffeur from hell during the June 15
attacks claimed by al-Shabaab.
While some may doubt Suleiman’s story, his portrayal of events was
mirrored in the subsequent attack at Gamba in which Kenyan police
officers say militants “got to the police station by car-jacking a truck
and killing its three occupants.”
Additionally, the Kenyan government (GoK) said it had “prior
intelligence” of an imminent threat around Lamu before the Mpeketoni
attack. This would ostensibly indicate that GoK would have some tangible
proof of key individuals or groups that were organizing the attack.
However, after the attack, United Democratic Forum (UDF) member and Lamu
governor Issa Timamy was booked on murder/terrorism charges without
any convincing evidence being presented publicly. In fact, police even
asked for more time after his arrest to search for more evidence–all
signs that this was not a slam dunk case as of yet.
After al-Shabaab claimed carrying out operations in the Hindi and Gamba
areas, Kenyan police blamed the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)
separatists after finding hastily scribbled messages referencing the
group (and CORD leader Raila Odinga) on a small school blackboard.
But the meaning of the messages was not perfectly clear.
The first message read in Kiswahili “Raila [is] sufficient.” This could
have been a reference to his call for Kenyan troops to withdraw from
Somalia–or any other number of interpretations.
The second message appeared to be directed at MRC members–not from them
as interpreted by Kenyan police. It called for “sleeping” Muslims in MRC
to “wake up”–followed by very specific anti-Uhuru anti-Christian
imperatives.
If this was the basis for blaming MRC, Kenyan police look as if they
have a case that is weak enough to preclude singling the group out as
exclusively responsible–especially considering the tactics used in the
operations.
The Quran tests used in militants’ recent Coast attacks mirror similar
tactics used at the Westgate siege, which was organized by al-Qaeda East
Africa apprentice/al-Shabaab commander Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir
“Ikrima.”
Notably, the Westgate attack also may have used the resources of an
al-Hijra-linked al-Shabaab leader for Kenyans named Sheikh Ahmad Iman
Ali–who may have a hand in Coast attacks as well.
The recite-or-die tactic does not appear to have been used by other
opposition groups in Kenya–though the knife and arson attacks that have
occurred are alleged modes of operation for MRC.
Additionally, it has been rumored in the past that al-Shabaab has tried
to recruit among extreme factions of MRC–which has both Christian and
Muslim membership. This convenient exploitation is possible, and
al-Shabaab has recruited from other East African groups with
longstanding grievances including Uamsho and the Ansar Muslim Youth
Centre in Tanzania.
Yet no current proof has been presented that collaboration with MRC has
been operationalized in recent attacks.
Setting MRC to the side, there are plenty of other grievances holders on
the Coast that still seek redress.
Since GoK has failed to address the fact that many local communities on
the Coast have had land stolen from them by government officials and
other tribes in the last several decades, it is no surprise that
al-Shabaab would be recruiting among them.
As many of these potential recruits would be Muslim “squatters,” their
narratives are interesting to unwrap in the regional context.
When Coast attackers speak of “Christian invaders” stealing territory
and abusing Muslims in “Muslim lands,” their argument is applicable to
them both in Kenya and Somalia.
Al-Shabaab is using this duality to its advantage by recruiting and
carrying out attacks in both countries.
Contrastingly, Uhuru is misguidedly re-framing the argument as a mostly
local and tribal issue–seemingly in pursuit of his own political agenda
while ignoring the larger context.
Uhuru is able to redirect blame at “local political networks” rather
than open up the possibility that extremist groups are exploiting these
very dynamics.
Future Implications
Common sense on recent attacks in Kenya point to al-Shabaab and its
affiliated sympathizers, but this should not discount other actors.
Equally important, understanding the possibilities of who is working
with extremist groups requires a realization that different types of
people are involved: those possibly looking for a quick buck, those
allegedly kidnapped by extremists, Kenyans not “of Somali origin,” and
potentially others with varying motivations.
Without knowing the nature of the problem, Kenya can not claim to know
the nature of the solution.
The GoK’s failure to present concrete evidence about who is responsible,
its non-sensical and ineffective policies in response to attacks, and
its politicization of investigations will further sow confusion and
subsequent scapegoating among the public against blameless targets.
It is this kind of increased social anxiety and resorting to
stereotyping that could exacerbate tribal and religious tensions that
extremists need to legitimize their cause and violent operations.
While Uhuru should in theory rush to correct these mis-steps, security
often plays second fiddle to domestic political goals.
