Post by miguna on Dec 6, 2005 6:53:28 GMT 3
ODM MUST BE PREPARED TO GOVERN
By MIGUNA MIGUNA* - © 5 December 2005
Politics is about power; how it is sought, acquired, managed and retained. In the pursuit of power, legitimate politicians and political parties have to engage in all kinds of activities to achieve this objective.
However, in a democracy, we expect all these activities to be legal, legitimate, honest, transparent, consultative and all-inclusive.
A representative democracy entails that decisions be made by those with or in power after widely consulting the people and receiving their consent, direction, guidance or approval.
On important national issues which are likely to affect most if not the entire nation, political leaders are required to consult widely and broadly without discrimination. In more developed democracies, these consultations occur through Town Hall meetings; call-in TV and radio programs; targeted meetings or conferences with representatives of political parties, special interest groups (such as professional, religious, business and non-governmental representatives); and a wide variety of citizens’ coalitions. The more divisive or important an issue is or is perceived to be, the more extensive the consultations. The recently conducted constitutional referendum falls under this category.
Selective consultations can only be done in less emotive cases or issues, or those that affect small, particular or limited groups or individuals. For instance, if an issue only affect coffee or sugar cane farmers, political leaders may restrict their consultations to members of these groups.
However, whether the required consultations are broad, wide or narrow, one distinct character they must have or reflect is “genuineness.” Public goodwill, trust and support can be lost in an instance due to the real or perceived appearance of dishonesty by those conducting or pretending to be holding consultations.
Anything short of these is likely to cause disaffection, despondence and even rebellion of the majority of the people against their government.
Politics is not about “economic development” per se. Economic development is supposed to be a by-product of good governance; not its precursor. Essentially, one has to acquire political power first before one is able to implement a program capable of generating employment, poverty alleviation, economic growth, equity, justice, universal health care, infrastructural reforms or renewals, and other issues that may be termed “development.” However, these “development” programs cannot exist and thrive under a stifling political climate; for it is only when one has the enthusiastic support of the majority of the governed does one get their focused and undivided attention. Absent this focused and undivided attention by the people, no amount of effort, rhetoric, tricks or propaganda can bring “development.”
Whether they are involved in agitations, negotiations, mobilizations or campaigns, all political participants are furthering their own individual ambitions as well as that of their affiliate parties. Anyone claiming otherwise is either completely ignorant of what politics is or is totally dishonest. For our present purposes, we are neither concerned about the ignorant nor of the dishonest.
In order to achieve and retain their main objective (being the acquisition and retention of power), both politicians and political parties must try to woo voters by putting forth their programs, platforms and agendas.
People are generally more amenable to be persuaded when the message is precise, clear, accessible, coherent and sensitive. If or when the majority of people feel a reasonable connection to a politician, position, platform, message or party, they are likely to turn out and vote in support of what or whom they feel connected to. Routinely, both the message and the messenger must be acceptable to the majority of voters for any specific individual, program or party to win a contested election.
The mechanisms, methods, logistics and manner of selling their message to the people, will, in large measure, determine whether they fail or succeed in achieving their primary goal. There is no short-cut to this process.
With the just-concluded referendum on the Wako Mongrel Draft Constitution that the Kibaki government attempted to force on the Kenyan people, there are two political entities in Kenya that have to either acquire or retain power.
The first group is the ODM. By thoroughly defeating President Kibaki and his Banana team on November 21st, 2005, with slightly over one million votes, the ODM has been propelled to a position of unofficial “government in waiting.” Traditionally, this is a position reserved for an Official Opposition Party in parliament. In the case of Kenya, however, it was the ODM, which consists mainly of both the Official Opposition Party in Parliament, KANU, and an estranged coalition partner, LDP, which organized and orchestrated the government’s defeat.
Just by looking at the number of votes ODM received and the number of people that attended their rallies, one can argue that ODM has managed to capture the majority of Kenyans’ support. That support can either be sustained or transformed into a massive vote either in parliament or in any electoral contest. But it can also be squandered if ODM fails to crystallize it into a cohesive political force with a visionary agenda and platform. To use the popular goodwill received during the referendum process, ODM should develop a progressive platform, with the constitutional reform agenda at the centre. It also ought to show discipline, seriousness and coherence of a mature outfit that is prepared to use its newly acquired popular support for the general and national public good. In so doing, ODM should refrain from unorthodox, uncoordinated and poorly prepared proclamations. It is more prudent to only announce broad policy initiatives rather than giving out the actual roadmaps ODM intends to follow in achieving its primary objective. This is to avoid poaching from ODM’s opponents. However, ODM should consider proactive ways of reaching and engaging the populace (other than through rallies, which Kibaki has shown his determination to frustrate). Some of these mechanisms are: salaried and volunteer village, clan, constituency, district and provincial committees; dissemination of ODM programs through print, internet, radio and TV media; and registration of ODM as a political entity and setting up of its structures.
Ultimately, ODM’s focus should be the preparation of the Kenyan people for its eventual unleashing of its electoral machine whenever elections are called.
The second group is the DP party and a section of Mount Kenya elites that congregate around president Kibaki. This group’s humiliating defeat showed how exposed its soft political underbelly has been. In I disagreeessment, the DP and those surrounding it require enormous reorientation before it may become a viable electoral vehicle in Kenya. It is difficult to tell whether DP leaders have the wherewithal to reorient or change course in order to survive. Political deception is not a feasible strategy in this regard.
ODM has the chance to completely and permanently relegate the DP and its elitist cohorts in political wilderness. From the manner that president Kibaki has reacted to his government’s defeat, it is now obvious that the DP elites have very limited ability to devise practicable survival strategies. That may be the only good news.
The sudden and unprecedented firing of the entire cabinet; the suspension of parliament; the failure to consult exhaustively and widely across the political spectrum; the reclusive hibernation of the president at State House, Nairobi, following closely on the heels of his ill-fated sporadic meetings with selective delegations where public resources were dished out without parliamentary allocation or approval; and the sheer length of time it has taken the president to “reorganize” his government; shows a disturbing level of executive indecisiveness, dictatorial streak and a stubborn refusal to take responsibility for the massive loss. These are not good things for the president. Neither do they argur well for the DP and the Mount Kenya elites.
However, they are a golden opportunity for the ODM. Consequently, the ODM should be deliberately, carefully and strategically preparing to govern. There is no need therefore to fall into the traps of the caged DP. ODM should allow DP to kill itself slowly. If wise, ODM leaders would do better to get as far away as possible from the leaking and sinking DP boat. A tumbling leaking boat in the middle of a tsunami is a dangerous place to be.
______________________________________________________________________
*The writer is a Barrister & Solicitor in Toronto, Canada
By MIGUNA MIGUNA* - © 5 December 2005
Politics is about power; how it is sought, acquired, managed and retained. In the pursuit of power, legitimate politicians and political parties have to engage in all kinds of activities to achieve this objective.
However, in a democracy, we expect all these activities to be legal, legitimate, honest, transparent, consultative and all-inclusive.
A representative democracy entails that decisions be made by those with or in power after widely consulting the people and receiving their consent, direction, guidance or approval.
On important national issues which are likely to affect most if not the entire nation, political leaders are required to consult widely and broadly without discrimination. In more developed democracies, these consultations occur through Town Hall meetings; call-in TV and radio programs; targeted meetings or conferences with representatives of political parties, special interest groups (such as professional, religious, business and non-governmental representatives); and a wide variety of citizens’ coalitions. The more divisive or important an issue is or is perceived to be, the more extensive the consultations. The recently conducted constitutional referendum falls under this category.
Selective consultations can only be done in less emotive cases or issues, or those that affect small, particular or limited groups or individuals. For instance, if an issue only affect coffee or sugar cane farmers, political leaders may restrict their consultations to members of these groups.
However, whether the required consultations are broad, wide or narrow, one distinct character they must have or reflect is “genuineness.” Public goodwill, trust and support can be lost in an instance due to the real or perceived appearance of dishonesty by those conducting or pretending to be holding consultations.
Anything short of these is likely to cause disaffection, despondence and even rebellion of the majority of the people against their government.
Politics is not about “economic development” per se. Economic development is supposed to be a by-product of good governance; not its precursor. Essentially, one has to acquire political power first before one is able to implement a program capable of generating employment, poverty alleviation, economic growth, equity, justice, universal health care, infrastructural reforms or renewals, and other issues that may be termed “development.” However, these “development” programs cannot exist and thrive under a stifling political climate; for it is only when one has the enthusiastic support of the majority of the governed does one get their focused and undivided attention. Absent this focused and undivided attention by the people, no amount of effort, rhetoric, tricks or propaganda can bring “development.”
Whether they are involved in agitations, negotiations, mobilizations or campaigns, all political participants are furthering their own individual ambitions as well as that of their affiliate parties. Anyone claiming otherwise is either completely ignorant of what politics is or is totally dishonest. For our present purposes, we are neither concerned about the ignorant nor of the dishonest.
In order to achieve and retain their main objective (being the acquisition and retention of power), both politicians and political parties must try to woo voters by putting forth their programs, platforms and agendas.
People are generally more amenable to be persuaded when the message is precise, clear, accessible, coherent and sensitive. If or when the majority of people feel a reasonable connection to a politician, position, platform, message or party, they are likely to turn out and vote in support of what or whom they feel connected to. Routinely, both the message and the messenger must be acceptable to the majority of voters for any specific individual, program or party to win a contested election.
The mechanisms, methods, logistics and manner of selling their message to the people, will, in large measure, determine whether they fail or succeed in achieving their primary goal. There is no short-cut to this process.
With the just-concluded referendum on the Wako Mongrel Draft Constitution that the Kibaki government attempted to force on the Kenyan people, there are two political entities in Kenya that have to either acquire or retain power.
The first group is the ODM. By thoroughly defeating President Kibaki and his Banana team on November 21st, 2005, with slightly over one million votes, the ODM has been propelled to a position of unofficial “government in waiting.” Traditionally, this is a position reserved for an Official Opposition Party in parliament. In the case of Kenya, however, it was the ODM, which consists mainly of both the Official Opposition Party in Parliament, KANU, and an estranged coalition partner, LDP, which organized and orchestrated the government’s defeat.
Just by looking at the number of votes ODM received and the number of people that attended their rallies, one can argue that ODM has managed to capture the majority of Kenyans’ support. That support can either be sustained or transformed into a massive vote either in parliament or in any electoral contest. But it can also be squandered if ODM fails to crystallize it into a cohesive political force with a visionary agenda and platform. To use the popular goodwill received during the referendum process, ODM should develop a progressive platform, with the constitutional reform agenda at the centre. It also ought to show discipline, seriousness and coherence of a mature outfit that is prepared to use its newly acquired popular support for the general and national public good. In so doing, ODM should refrain from unorthodox, uncoordinated and poorly prepared proclamations. It is more prudent to only announce broad policy initiatives rather than giving out the actual roadmaps ODM intends to follow in achieving its primary objective. This is to avoid poaching from ODM’s opponents. However, ODM should consider proactive ways of reaching and engaging the populace (other than through rallies, which Kibaki has shown his determination to frustrate). Some of these mechanisms are: salaried and volunteer village, clan, constituency, district and provincial committees; dissemination of ODM programs through print, internet, radio and TV media; and registration of ODM as a political entity and setting up of its structures.
Ultimately, ODM’s focus should be the preparation of the Kenyan people for its eventual unleashing of its electoral machine whenever elections are called.
The second group is the DP party and a section of Mount Kenya elites that congregate around president Kibaki. This group’s humiliating defeat showed how exposed its soft political underbelly has been. In I disagreeessment, the DP and those surrounding it require enormous reorientation before it may become a viable electoral vehicle in Kenya. It is difficult to tell whether DP leaders have the wherewithal to reorient or change course in order to survive. Political deception is not a feasible strategy in this regard.
ODM has the chance to completely and permanently relegate the DP and its elitist cohorts in political wilderness. From the manner that president Kibaki has reacted to his government’s defeat, it is now obvious that the DP elites have very limited ability to devise practicable survival strategies. That may be the only good news.
The sudden and unprecedented firing of the entire cabinet; the suspension of parliament; the failure to consult exhaustively and widely across the political spectrum; the reclusive hibernation of the president at State House, Nairobi, following closely on the heels of his ill-fated sporadic meetings with selective delegations where public resources were dished out without parliamentary allocation or approval; and the sheer length of time it has taken the president to “reorganize” his government; shows a disturbing level of executive indecisiveness, dictatorial streak and a stubborn refusal to take responsibility for the massive loss. These are not good things for the president. Neither do they argur well for the DP and the Mount Kenya elites.
However, they are a golden opportunity for the ODM. Consequently, the ODM should be deliberately, carefully and strategically preparing to govern. There is no need therefore to fall into the traps of the caged DP. ODM should allow DP to kill itself slowly. If wise, ODM leaders would do better to get as far away as possible from the leaking and sinking DP boat. A tumbling leaking boat in the middle of a tsunami is a dangerous place to be.
______________________________________________________________________
*The writer is a Barrister & Solicitor in Toronto, Canada
